Secure Architectures Implementing Trusted Coalitions for Blockchained
  Distributed Learning (TCLearn) by Lugan, Sebastien et al.
Secure Architectures Implementing Trusted Coalitions for
Blockchained Distributed Learning (TCLearn)
Se´bastien Lugan PhD1, Paul Desbordes PhD1, Luis Xavier Ramos Tormo2, Axel Legay PhD1,
and Benoıˆt Macq PhD1
1ICTEAM, Universite´ catholique de Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium
2Massachuses Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, USA
Distributed learning across a coalition of organizations allows the members of the coalition to train and
share a model without sharing the data used to optimize this model. In this paper, we propose new secure
architectures that guarantee preservation of data privacy, trustworthy sequence of iterative learning and
equitable sharing of the learned model among each member of the coalition by using adequate encryption
and blockchain mechanisms. We exemplify its deployment in the case of the distributed optimization of
a deep learning convolutional neural network trained on medical images. a
ais work has been partially performed during eNTERFACE’18. It has been partly funded by Wal-e-Cities, a research project
co-funded by the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and Wallonia, Belgium.
1 Introduction
Deep learning algorithms, such as deep convolutional
neural networks (CNN) [1], are ecient tools to help data
scientists process the huge amounts of potentially very sen-
sitive data generated e.g. in medical, nancial or industrial
applications (including data generated from smart sensors
such as smart meters and other IoT sensors for smart cities
and industry 4.0, etc.). Practitioners, for instance, routinely
use such techniques for identifying various pathologies [2].
is machine learning algorithm progressively extracts high
level features from raw inputs thanks to multiple layers. e
quality and size of the datasets used for the training phase
have a major impact on performances. However, it may be
dicult for a single organization such as a health center to
gather enough data on its own, and multi-center studies are
oen hampered due to legal or ethical issues [3].
For these reasons, distributed learning [4] has been sug-
gested for multiple applications including the medical eld
[5] [6]. is approach facilitates the cooperation through
coalitions where each member keeps control and respon-
sibility over its own data (including the accountability for
privacy and consent of the data owners such as patients).
Batches of data are processed iteratively to locally feed a
shared model. Parameters generated at each step are then
sent to the other organizations to be validated as an ac-
ceptable global iteration for adjusting the model parameters.
us, partners of the coalition will jointly optimize a shared
model by dividing the learning set into batches correspond-
ing to blocks of data provided by the members of this coali-
tion.
e naive use of a CNN in a distributed environment
exposes it to a risk of corruption (intentional or not) during
the training phase because of the lack of monitoring of the
training increments and the diculty to control the qual-
ity of the training datasets. e distributed learning could
be monitored by a centralized certication authority which
would be in charge of the validation of each iteration of the
learning process. Alternatively, a blockchain could be used
to store auditable records of each and every transaction on
an immutable decentralized ledger. is approach has been
suggested in [7], where it is advocated that blockchains can
be used to store signatures of patient records. In our context,
the blockchain approach would provide distributed learning
with a more robust and equitable approach for the dier-
ent stakeholders involved in the learning process since all of
them are involved in the certication process. Blockchain-
based distributed learning has been described by Zhou et
al. [8]. eir architecture, called BeeKeeper 2.0, is deployed
on Hyperledger Fabric and uses Hyperledger Caliper for
performance testing. Weng et al. [9] proposed DeepChain
as an algorithm based on blockchain for privacy-preserving
deep learning training. It allows to perform a massive lo-
cal training of intermediate gradients and to securely aggre-
gate them among distrustful owners. DeepChain provides
the auditability and condentiality to locally train gradients
for each participant while employing economic incentives
to promote honest behavior. Nevertheless, it does not pre-
vent data exposure through a malicious partner.
e challenge is to derive a new model of coalitions with
a high degree of reliability, respecting data privacy and in-
centivizing the participation in the coalition without a cen-
tral authority. In this article, we propose novel scalable secu-
rity architectures, called Trusted Coalitions for distributed
Learning (TCLearn), based on either public or permissioned
blockchains to provide distributed deep learning with in-
creasing levels of security and privacy preservation.
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In our approach, a CNN model is shared among the
members of the coalition and is optimized in an iterative
sequence, each member of the coalition sequentially updat-
ing it with new batches of local data. Each iteration of the
shared model is validated by a process involving the mem-
bers of the coalition and is stored in the blockchain. Each
step of the evolution of the model can be retrieved from the
immutable ledger provided by the blockchain.
While early implementations of blockchains (such as
Bitcoin) initially relied on a proof-of-work [10] consen-
sus mechanism, others have been suggested since, such as
proof-of-stake [11]. Our approach has a dierent goal: we
aim at providing an iterative certication process for each
learning step of the shared model, all of them being regis-
tered in the underlying ledger. We therefore suggest a new
consensus mechanism integrating performance evaluation
using block validation as part of our suggested Federated
Byzantine Agreement (FBA).
In this article, the model designates a CNN architecture
with its associated weights (parameters). e gradients rep-
resent the evolution of the model weights aer a training
step. e supervisor is an entity handling the storage of the
model and controlling its access.
1.1 Distributed learning for a medical
application: an example
To illustrate the use of distributed learning, we propose
to apply it on a medical challenge that has already been
solved using CNN: bladder contouring on computed tomog-
raphy scans [12] [13]. Le´ger et al. [12] [13] proposed to use
U-Net, inspired by [14], to segment the bladder of 339 pa-
tients suering from prostate cancer. eir semi-automatic
approach takes two channels as input (a 3D volume of the
bladder with one of its slices manually labeled by an expert)
and outputs a prediction for the target tile bladder segmen-
tation.
We reproduced their results using parameters and
database used by Le´ger et al. [12] [13]. In addition, we split
the initial database into several subsets to simulate several
partners. us, the training was performed in two dierent
ways: a centralized training using all the training samples
in one run and a distributed learning successively using the
smaller datasets created. Once the training over, the accu-
racy achieved with a distributed database is not signicantly
dierent from a centralized training (88.4% and 88.7%, re-
spectively).
is simple medical use case constitutes an exemplary
application of distributed learning that raises several secu-
rity challenges which are listed in the next section.
1.2 Security requirements in TCLearn
Four challenges have been identied.
Challenge 1: protection of the model against
degradation by training on inadequate data
e model is exposed to a risk of corruption or degrada-
tion during the training phase. e evolution of the model
must be resilient against malicious or clumsy actions to en-
sure increasing performances. For instance, a partner could
aempt to train the model from corrupted data or from a
dierent pathology than the studied one. e proposed ap-
proach must detect this kind of misuse and reject the result-
ing increment.
Challenge 2: data privacy of the dataset used for
the training
Even if distributed learning allows to share a model within
a consortium while keeping control over the data, it might
be possible to reconstruct part of the training set from the
generated gradients. is phenomenon is called long term
memory eect [15] and should be avoided.
Challenge 3: condentiality of the model and the
gradients
If the learned model has to be condential, it is necessary to
protect it and its gradients from any potential deliberate or
accidental leak outside the consortium.
Challenge 4: traceability of the model
e blockchain keeps track of each and every modication
to the model, but does not prevent unauthorized use of the
shared model outside the coalition. Traceability of every op-
eration involving the model must be ensured to deter any
malicious event.
2 A Scalable Security Architecture
for Trusted Coalitions
Articles such as [21] give an illustration of the well-
known trade-o issue between security and cost. In this sec-
tion, we will develop three dierent methods corresponding
to three distinct trust levels depending on the shared rules
in the coalition:
• Method TCLearn-A: the learned model is public but
each member of the coalition is accountable for the
privacy protection of his own data.
• Method TCLearn-B: the learned model is private
(shared only within the coalition) and the members
of the coalition are trusting each other.
• Method TCLearn-C: the members of the coalition
do not trust each other and want to prevent any un-
fair behavior from any of them, such as unauthorized
use or leak of the model outside the coalition.
ese three methods address the previously described
security issues at dierent levels (see Table 1), oering an
inherent tradeo between security needs and costs.
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Data Protection against Model Model
Privacy degradation Privacy traceability
TCLearn-A ++ ++ - -
TCLearn-B ++ ++ + +
TCLearn-C ++ ++ ++ ++
Table 1: Summary of the features for the three TCLearn methods(-: absent, +: basic, ++: developed)
2.1 Architecture TCLearn-A
Type of coalition: coalition sharing a public model built using
private datasets. e integrity of the increments is ensured
through the use of a new FBA protocol.
Mechanism to guarantee challenge 1 (protection of
the model against degradation by training on inadequate
data)
Our approach relies on a blockchain to carry unalterable
cryptographic hashes of the successive training steps of a
model built in a distributed environment. e iteratively
optimized model is made public. Each block represents an
iteration step achieved locally by a specic member of the
coalition and validated by the whole coalition. First, the
model and the genesis block are initialized, seing the archi-
tecture (layers, activation functions, loss function, etc.) and
the weights according to a normal distribution. e weights
of the model are updated iteratively by the batches of data
provided by the members of the coalition.
In our approach, we use a blockchain relying on a feder-
ated byzantine agreement to prevent corrupted increments
caused by inadequate training to be added to the model. e
candidate increment has to be validated by multiple valida-
tors. e role of the FBA is to validate the concatenation of
a new block to the chain. Since the blockchain and the deep
learning model are strongly linked in TCLearn, the FBA has
two goals:
• Control the quality of the updated CNN model;
• Control the integrity of the new block (hash, index,
timestamp, etc.).
e FBA process starts with the random selection of val-
idators within the consortium. e chance to be selected de-
pends on the size of the consortium and the proportion of
data brought by each member (Equation 1).
Si = 1/N + Di/D (1)
where Si is the strength of the partner i, N the total num-
ber of partners in the consortium,D the total amount of sam-
ples used for the model and Di the amount of samples sup-
plied by the partner i. Initially, this strength is the same for
each of the partners and evolves with each contribution. e
main role of the validators is to check the candidate model
Mi+1 incremented from Mi proposed by a partner. Mi+1 must
show an improvement over the previous model. Enforcing
this improvement prevents a degradation of performances
caused by the presence of corrupted data in the training set.
Two types of test databases are used to assess the perfor-
mances of each increment of the model (Fig. 1) and to avoid
the introduction of invalid or inadequate training sets:
• A global test database (G), common for every block
creation and for all the partners. is database is cre-
ated by experts to be representative of the pathology.
• A local test database (L), dierent for each partner in
the consortium. To avoid overing on the global test
dataset (G), a small percentage of the input signals
is locally put aside for each contribution. It is later
used by each validator as a local test set to individu-
ally evaluate the proposed model.
Both datasets are used for the testing phase. First, re-
sults obtained using the common, global dataset are com-
pared between the validators to ensure that the candidate
model is functional and identical. en, those “global” re-
sults are merged with those obtained using the individual,
local datasets. To be accepted, the candidate model must
have higher performances than the previous model within
a specic threshold λ (∈ [0, 1]) (Equation 2).
Block creation IF λ ∗ perf (Mi) > perf (Mi+1) (2)
G
LA
LC
LB
A
B
C
Validators
Model 
integrity
Model 
acceptance
Performance 
evaluation
G
G
Figure 1: Federated byzantine agreement and candidate
model checking process. Two datasets are used: a global
one (G), similar for all the partners, used for the control of
the model integrity and a local one (L), dierent for all the
partners, used for the performance evaluation. Aer a ma-
jority vote, the candidate model is accepted or not.
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Once the model is accepted, a new block can be created.
First, the block creation requires to randomly select a “gen-
eral” (or “speaker”) among the validators. e “general” will
be the creator of a new block containing the reference to the
validated model Mi+1 and the ID of the partner who pro-
posed it. Every validator then checks the integrity of this
candidate block.
is block is analyzed in the frame of a delegated byzan-
tine fault tolerance system. Each validator broadcasts its
opinion (acceptance or rejection) regarding this block to the
other validators. If at least two thirds of the validators agree,
the FBA process can stop, leading to the acceptance or the
rejection of the block. If not, the role of “general” is switched
to another randomly selected validator and the block cre-
ation process can restart. If the block is accepted by the val-
idators, the “general” can append it to the blockchain and
broadcasts this update to the whole consortium, requesting
synchronization of the blockchains.
e global scheme of TCLearn-A is represented Fig. 2.
Partner Validators
Extract Mi from 
the blockchain
Train on the 
new data Di+1
Send tmp(Mi+1)
Performance 
evaluation
Notify the 
update
Consortium
Figure 2: Scheme of the TCLearn-A procedure. Partner
trains a model (Mi) on their data (Di+1). e candidate model
tmp(Mi+1) is validated by federal byzantine agreement.
Each block includes:
• Block index
• Timestamp
• Previous block hash
• Hash of the model’s parameters
• User ID: identication of the contributor
• Users’ strength: contribution level of every member
for the FBA
• Block hash
Mechanism to guarantee challenge 2 (data privacy
of the dataset used for the training)
A partner willing to improve a model rst fetches the cur-
rent version of the model, trains it locally with its own
datasets and nally uploads the resulting gradients. is
way, the datasets used for training never leave the part-
ner’s infrastructure, ensuring their privacy and excluding
any leakage of the processed data. Aer this training, the
generated gradients Gi+1 are uploaded and merged with the
previous model Mi , leading to a candidate model, noted
tmp(Mi+1).
Several approaches have been proposed in the literature
to mitigate the long term memory eect. As an example,
adding some noise to the uploaded gradients has been con-
sidered in [16]. is leads to a trade-o between data pri-
vacy and training performances. Other approaches rely on
Homomorphic Encryption (HE) techniques [17]. Abadi et
al. [18] established a link between the size of the dataset di-
vided in batches and the condentiality on the original data.
Consequently, we propose to iterate the learning model by
batches with a minimum size.
2.2 Architecture TCLearn-B
Type of coalition: coalition sharing a private model built
using private datasets among a restricted consortium of
trusted partners. e integrity of the increments is ensured
through the use of FBA protocol. In this situation, the model
has to be protected during transfers between partners and
for its storage.
Mechanism to guarantee challenges 1 & 2
is approach being based on TCLearn-A, the data privacy
of the inputs is preserved and the model iterations are vali-
dated by members of the coalition.
Mechanism to guarantee challenge 3 (condentiality
of the model and the gradients)
With TCLearn-A, the evolutions of the model are certied
by the blockchain. However, this scheme does not oer con-
dentiality guarantee on the model during its distribution to
partners. is situation is not acceptable in some situations
where the privacy of the model should be preserved (for ex-
ample if the members of the coalition would like to avoid
any leakage of the model).
To solve this issue, the storage, transfer and upgrade
through gradient computations of the model have to be pro-
tected by encryption, where the private keys are stored by
some trusted entities. In this work, we propose to isolate all
iterations of the model in an external, o-chain encrypted
storage (“vault”) and control its access by each partner.
We also suggest the use of secure transport (e.g. TLS
or S/MIME, cf. section 3 for details) for transferring the
model. Moreover, the model could be securely stored us-
ing an ecient encryption method and by implementing ac-
cess control and auditing mechanisms (see section 3 for de-
tails). Only authorized users should be able to download a
given version of the model weights, and each access should
be logged into an audit trail.
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Encryption K+(Mi)
Train (different 
for B* and C**)
Performance 
evaluation
Notify the update
Supervisor Off-chain
storage
Request Mi
Access Control
Download K+(Mi)
Send K+(Gi+1)
Decrypt 
K-(K+(Gi+1)) → Gi+1 
Merge Mi with Gi+1
→ tmp(Mi+1)
 
Send tmp(Mi+1)
Decrypt 
K-(K+(Mi)) → Mi 
Train on new data 
Di+1 → Gi+1 
Encryption 
K+(Gi+1)
*TCLEARN-B
PartnerValidators
Extract Mi from 
the blockchain
Request Mi
Send Mi
Homomorphic 
Encryption K+(Di+1) 
Train on new data 
K+(Di+1) → K
+(Gi+1) 
**TCLEARN-C
(Request/Encryption/Download)
Figure 3: Scheme of the TCLearn-B & C procedure. e
partner trains a model (Mi) on their data (Di+1) leading to
new gradients (Gi+1). e model is successively encrypted
and decrypted, e.g. using a public (K+) and a private key
(K–), respectively. e candidate model (tmp(Mi+1)) is vali-
dated by federated byzantine agreement. e two methods
are principally distinct by the training process in or out of
the encryption domain.
Mechanism to guarantee challenge 4 (traceability of
the model)
In order to (1) ensure that only authorized participants are
granted access to the models and (2) to minimize the risks
of leak, we propose to store the actual models (including the
associated weights) in an external, secure “vault” (o-chain
storage).
In this o-chain storage approach, the blockchain only
provides “links” to the corresponding version of the model.
is introduces a single point of failure (the secure, o-chain
storage and its associated access control infrastructure), but
oers three major advantages. First, it greatly reduces the
size of the blockchain while increasing its scalability: each
participant needs to synchronize fewer data. Second, this
approach permits to implement an active access control to
all of the stored information (e.g. who is allowed to ac-
cess which kind of data, when and how). Finally, each of
the requests to access the secure, o-chain storage could
be recorded in a journal, oering the ability to audit all ac-
cesses to any record. is audit could possibly be used to
gather statistics about the actual accesses of each individual
user to models. is in turn could be used to restrain future
accesses (e.g. allowing user to access a certain number of
models depending on their level of contribution to the mod-
els). erefore, a moderated level of traceability is oered:
in case of leak of a given version of a model, it is possible to
audit all of the requests related to this specic version pre-
dating the leak in order to establish a list of partners which
actually downloaded this version and potentially leaked it.
e blockchain/oine storage approach requires an en-
tity (the “supervisor”) managing the access control and the
secure storage of the models (see section 3 for details). An
overview of this approach is presented in Fig. 3.
2.3 Architecture TCLearn-C
Type of coalition: coalition sharing a private model built us-
ing private datasets among a restricted consortium of un-
trusting partners. e integrity of the increments is ensured
through the use of FBA protocol. To protect the model in
this situation, it is necessary to secure the exchanges and
the storage even at the partners’ facilities.
Mechanism to guarantee challenges 1 & 2
is approach being based on TCLearn-A, the data privacy
of the inputs is preserved and the model iterations are vali-
dated by members of the coalition.
Mechanism to guarantee challenges 3 & 4
In this scenario, our objective is to identify the partner re-
sponsible for the leakage of a model. Such identication
could be performed by adding some unique, hidden infor-
mation to the model provided to each partner, e.g. by alter-
ing the weights by introducing a moderate noise following
a specic, hidden paern (constituting a watermark) every
time the model is requested by a partner. Both the date of
the access, the identity of the partner and the associated hid-
den paern (the watermark) could then be stored in an au-
dit trail allowing to uniquely identify the partner associated
with a leaked model. Unfortunately, CNN are quite robust
to a slight alteration of the weights, which means that an ad-
verse party might try to alter those (watermarked) weights,
jeopardizing the recovery of the watermark while keeping
the model usable. is adverse party could even perform a
subsequent training of the model on new datasets, further
compromising the recoverability of the watermark.
Another option could be to send to each partner a model
encrypted with a specic key, allowing them to manipu-
late (use and even train) it while being unable to decrypt
it. Some crypto algorithms (such as the ElGamal scheme
[19]) allow operations to be performed directly on the en-
crypted data without knowing the associated private key.
For instance, the ElGamal scheme oers an encrypted prod-
uct operator allowing to compute the product E(m1 · m2) =
HM(E(m1), E(m2)) of two encrypted messages E(m1) and
E(m2). An operator oering such a property constitutes
a homomorphic operator. An encryption algorithm oer-
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ing both homomorphic product and homomorphic addition,
such as the Brakerski-Gentry-Vaikuntanathan scheme [20],
constitutes a fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) scheme.
Homomorphic encryption brings a new level of protec-
tion to the model (since actually only the supervisor is able
to decrypt it), but also a considerable drawback: in order to
perform prediction, the encrypted result must be send by the
partner to the supervisor to be decrypted and the nal result
sent back to the partner. is reduces the autonomy of the
partners (depending on the supervisor to perform any pre-
diction using the model) and potentially introduces a single
point of failure.
Similarly to TCLearn-B, the condentiality and the dis-
tribution control over the models is ensured by o-chain
storage of the models and gradients. However, since the
members of the consortium do not trust each other, no mem-
ber should have access to unencrypted models or gradients.
is is ensured by the use of the aforementioned homo-
morphic encryption technique. In order to use the model
(prediction), the input signals must rst be encrypted us-
ing the same technique and the same homomorphic public
key (which must be sent together with the encrypted models
and gradients to each partner). is public key could only
be used to encrypt (and not decrypt) data. Once the pre-
diction operation (using encrypted model and input signals)
performed, the result must be decrypted, which must be per-
formed by the supervisor (which holds both the homomor-
phic public and private keys corresponding to the models
sent to each partner). e supervisor uses its homomorphic
private key to decrypt the result, which is then sent to the
requesting partner. e supervisor must carefully inspect
the “results” to be decrypted in order to reject any aempt
to decrypt models or gradients.
3 TCLearn implementations
considerations
3.1 Additional features
In addition to the TCLearn approaches, we propose two
optional extra features.
Reverting to a previous state of the model
Each and every increment of the model recorded on the
blockchain and validated using the FBA are accessible by the
partners. In case of a late detection of corruption, it could be
necessary to restore the model to one of its previous states.
For this reason, we add the possibility to perform prediction
or even continue the training from old weights stored in the
o-chain storage. Only authorized partners are able to per-
form this operation, in which case a new block is generated,
outshining previous learning steps.
Updates to the model hyperparameters
e model architecture (kernel size, number of layers etc.)
is initialized in the genesis block of the blockchain but some
hyperparameters can be modied during the learning step
(epoch number, batch size). e learning rate of the op-
timizer for the gradient descent is a critical parameter. It
could be high at the beginning of the blockchain because the
model is still naive, but the more precise, the lower the learn-
ing rate should be (without becoming too low). A method
that automatically adapts the learning rate according to the
performances of the model could be integrated into our con-
cept [22].
Audit & traceability of the training data
e evaluation of performances may not be enough to avoid
duplicate input signals during training. For this reason,
anonymous IDs can be aached to each input signal and
stored in the o-chain storage. is process also enforces
the auditability and the traceability of the input signals. is
can be implemented as an additional eld stored in each
block, such as an anonymized data ID, therefore avoiding
training on duplicate input signals.
3.2 Secure authentication and transport of
the model
e secure authentication and transport of the model
could be performed in two ways: either online (requiring
direct, interactive communication between the partner and
the supervisor) or oine (allowing for delayed communi-
cation, e.g. using periodic batches of le transfers or using
e-mail).
In the former case, we strongly recommend using an
industry-standard protocol such as TLS (Transport Layer
Security) v.1.3 (RFC 8446), which is used for instance in
HTTPS. In contrast with network-level encryption (such as
IPsec VPNs), TLS oers end-to-end encryption that guar-
antees the condentiality of the model and gradients, in-
cluding between the secure gateway (e.g. VPN concentra-
tor) and the machine performing the machine learning. e
server (the supervisor) must be authenticated by validat-
ing its X.509 certication chain. e identity of the client
could also optionally be requested (using a X.509 certicate
chain) in order to provide a stronger authentication mecha-
nism. Once the TLS handshake and authentication success-
fully performed, the model and its gradients could be safely
exchanged using strong encryption (such as AES-256).
In the laer case, we suggest to use industry-standard
protocol such as S/MIME (RFC 5751). Both the supervisor
and the partner need to possess X.509 certicates, which
could be used to both authenticate (digital signature of the
request from the partner and of the reply from the supervi-
sor) and encrypt the data (using the public key of the partner
so that only this partner could decrypt it). In this scenario,
the partner could send a request, digitally signing it using
its X.509 private key; the supervisor ensures the authentic-
ity of the request by verifying the provided digital signature
(decrypts it using the partner’s public key). Once the part-
ner (and the correspond request) authenticated, the super-
visor could send the encrypted model and gradients. is
operation could e.g. be performed by the supervisor by rst
generating a random session key which could be used as a
symmetric key with a symmetric encryption system such as
AES. is random session key is then encrypted using the
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partner’s public key (so that only him/her could decrypt it
using his/her private key) and sent along with the encrypted
model and gradients to the partner. e partner then simply
needs to decrypt the symmetric session key using his/her
private key, and then using this (decrypted) session key in
order to decrypt the message. is scheme (illustrated in
Fig. 3) requires each party to possess an X.509 certicate
and the associated private key in order to decrypt informa-
tion provided by other parties.
3.3 Considerations regarding the use of
homomorphism in CNN
In TCLearn-C we suggest the use of homomorphic en-
cryption to ensure traceability and condentiality of the
model (cf. section 2.C). In this scenario, the whole manipu-
lation of the CNN takes place in the homomorphic domain,
which introduces some challenges that are described here-
aer.
First, the neural network algorithm requires to use
and combine both addition and multiplication operations.
Consequently, the “somewhat homomorphic encryption”
scheme (see ElGamal [19], BGV [20] or Paillier [23]), which
allows the use of one sole type of homomorphic arith-
metic operation, cannot be used. We thus have to use FHE,
which requires considerable memory and computational re-
sources.
e use of CNN in the homomorphic domain also in-
troduces implementation issues. Indeed, while most FHE
implementations only support homomorphic addition and
homomorphic multiplication, implementation of CNN acti-
vation functions in the homomorphic domain requires com-
plex operations such as trigonometric (tanH), exponentials
(sigmoid), or tests (ReLU). Zhang et al. [24] proposed the use
of a Taylor development to replace the sigmoid function in
order to compensate the lack of exponential function in FHE
schemes. Albeit this method allows us to use the sigmoid
function in the homomorphic domain, it remains approxi-
mate. Moreover, it still considerably increases the amount
of operations to be performed.
Solving those problems has been the subject of some re-
cent work. As an example, in [25], Bourse et al. presented a
framework for homomorphic evaluation of neural networks
using a highly optimized FHE algorithm. is scheme,
named TFHE, oers several orders of magnitude perfor-
mance improvements over previous FHE architectures. In
this article, the authors used of a “discretized” neural net-
work to allow the creation of a model capable of ing data
from the MNIST database. Several tips are proposed to re-
duce the time required for learning and prediction (boot-
strapping, look-up table, noise management).
One could thus use Bourse’s solution. If this approach is
not sucient to mitigate the resource issues associated with
TCLearn-C, the training process could alternatively be per-
formed using tamper-proof black boxes deployed in each of
the partner’s facilities. Such black boxes could be used to
decrypt the CNN model, retrain it, and then re-encrypt it
without anyone being able to interfere. However, this so-
lution requires all of the partners to request the installation
and maintenance of this black box by a trusted third party
service provider.
4 Conclusions
In this article, we propose a new architecture for dis-
tributed learning of a model based on a mechanism of fed-
erated byzantine agreement. e performance of the model
is ensured through a shared evaluation of individual contri-
butions leading to the acceptance or rejection based on an
objective criterion.
is approach allows to constitute trusted coalitions in
which the actions for updating the model by the mem-
bers are registered on a public ledger implemented as a
blockchain. We have explored three kinds of coalitions de-
pending on the access control required for the distribution of
the model. Each approach corresponds to distinct trust lev-
els depending on the shared rules in the coalition. We have
proposed solutions that rely on ecient cryptographic tools
including homomorphic encryption. We have exemplied
our proposed architectures for the case of the distributed
learning of a CNN model applied to distributed medical im-
ages databases. e proposed architectures allow keeping
data privacy thanks to a system of encryption and o-chain
storage avoiding the dissemination of sensitive medical data
or metadata.
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